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THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THIRD 
PARTY DEFENSE UNDER CERCLA 
Michael Gibney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), out of concern 
over the need to clean up hazardous waste sites. l CERCLA estab-
lished the Superfund to finance costly cleanups.2 In 1986, the Act 
was amended by the passage of the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA) which changed several provisions and 
increased the size of the Superfund. 3 Many of the SARA changes to 
CERCLA reflect the recognition that CERCLA, as originally 
passed, underestimated the immense cost of cleaning up the many 
hazardous waste sites in this country.4 Conversely, another change 
narrowed the scope of liability under CERCLA, thus narrowing the 
possible sources of recovery of clean-up costs. 5 This change reflected 
a recognition that CERCLA, as originally passed, went too far in 
some aspects of imposing liability for the cost of cleanup on private 
parties. 
Both CERCLA and SARA represent a legislative response to the 
tremendous danger to human life and the ecosystem presented by 
the introduction of toxic materials into groundwater and soil. 6 Con-
gress recognized the threat that leaks in disposal sites or improper 
* Articles Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
142 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
2 [d. § 9361 (repealed and replaced by 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987)). 
3 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
4 Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 501-531, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
5 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). 
6 H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2836. 
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disposal posed earlier, and addressed that threat in legislation such 
as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 7 RCRA 
gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority over 
enumerated hazardous wastes from cradle to grave, as well as au-
thority over generators, transporters, and disposers of those 
wastes.8 RCRA focused, however, chiefly on keeping track of wastes 
as they were being disposed, and on dealing with proper disposal 
techniques.9 There were no details in RCRA setting out methods for 
cleaning up wastes that had already contaminated the soil or ground-
water. 
CERCLA and SARA, then, may be viewed as efforts to cover 
areas of the hazardous waste problem that RCRA did not address. 
RCRA sets performance standards rather than establishing a stan-
dard of liability for improper handling of the enumerated hazardous 
wastes.1O In contrast, CERCLA deals explicitly with liability for 
release of hazardous wastes. 11 
CERCLA provides two methods to clean up hazardous waste leaks 
or illegal dumping. 12 First, the EPA may conduct a cleanup of the 
hazardous waste and pay for that cleanup out of the Superfund. 13 
The EPA may then initiate a civil action against the parties deemed 
liable under the Act in order to recover sums expended from the 
Superfund. 14 The other option available to the EPA is to seek an 
7 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 
& Supp. III 1985». 
842 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(3) (1982). That section expresses recognition that, ''the continuing 
concentration of our population in expanding metropolitan and other urban areas has presented 
these communities with serious . . . management . . . and technical problems in the disposal 
of solid wastes .... " Id. 
9Id. § 6924. 
I°Id. 
11 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). 
12 Unless otherwise indicated in the text, references to CERCLA include amendments 
incorporated into the statute by SARA. 
18 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9611-9613 (1982). The original fund of $1.6 billion was derived 
from a tax on petroleum and feedstock chemicals, with the remainder coming from general 
revenues. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b) (1982) (repealed 1986). SARA replaced the previous funding 
provision by increasing the size of the Superfund to $8.5 billion over five years by increasing 
existing taxes and adding a tax on imported chemical derivatives, and an environmental tax. 
Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 11-17, 100 Stat. 1613, 1760-74 (1986) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987». 
14 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). Section 9607(a) enumerates persons 
liable: 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or o~herwise arranged for disposal or 
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administrative order or court order compelling the parties respon-
sible under the Act to conduct the cleanup themselves (or hire out-
side help to do the same).15 These methods were designed to 
promptly and effectively clean up hazardous waste sites while allo-
cating clean-up costs to the responsible parties. 16 
Congress strongly implied a standard of strict liability in CER-
CLA, though it deleted actual reference to strict liability in the final 
adoption of the Act in 1980.17 The legislation is also silent as to how 
liability should be apportioned in a CERCLA suit, though most 
jurisdictions hold defendants jointly and severally liable. 18 
The Act provides a very limited set of affirmative defenses, how-
ever, that are available to the liable parties. Two of these defenses, 
one that the release of hazardous substances was caused by an act 
of God, and the other that the release was caused by an act of war, 19 
are by their nature provisions that would only apply in the most 
extreme of circumstances. Section 9607(b)(3), the third defense, is 
not aimed at circumstances quite so unusual as the previous two 
defenses. In light of the statute's strict liability standard of liability, 
the inclusion of section 9607(b )(3) is significant. 2o This section allows 
assertion of the affirmative defense that the release or threatened 
release was caused solely by some act or omission of some party 
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or by a party 
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual rela-
[d. 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or 
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or 
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release .... 
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). 
16 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. 
1742 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982). This subsection states that liability in this act is that of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (33 U.S.C. § 1321). The standard of liability 
evolved through statutory interpretation of this act is strict liability. See United States v. 
Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1978). Presumably, strict liability language was 
not expressly included in the final bili (it was included in draft form) because it would have 
weakened support of CERCLA. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
18 See United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 991 
(D.S.C. 1984). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1),(2) (1982). 
20 See W. KEETON, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534 (1984). The basis for 
strict liability is not tied to the exercise of due care, but § 9607(b)(3) makes the exercise of 
due care an element in avoiding strict liability. [d. 
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tionship with the defendant. 21 The defendant must establish that he 
or she exercised due care with the hazardous substance in light of 
all relevant facts and circumstances, and took precautions against 
foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party and the foreseeable 
consequences of those acts. 22 
Section 9607(b)(3) provides for an extremely narrow defense 
through three important elements. The first element of the defense 
denies causation by asserting that a third party solely caused the 
release or threatened release. 23 The second element is an assertion 
of due care on the part of the defendant. 24 The third element is the 
taking of precautions against acts or omissions of the third party, 
but only against such acts or omissions as are foreseeable. 25 This 
defense is further limited by denying its availability where the third 
party is an agent or employee of the defendant asserting the defense, 
or where the third party and the defendant are in a contractual 
relationship of some sort. 26 
To date, the courts have been extremely reluctant to allow defen-
dants, in actions to recover response costs, to successfully interpose 
the affirmative defense of third party action coupled with due care. 27 
This reluctance in large part results from the heavy burden of proof 
defendants must meet to use the defense as drafted. 28 
This Comment examines the evolution of the third party/due care 
affirmative defense, beginning with its creation in the Congress and 
extending to treatment in the courts, both prior and subsequent to 
SARA. The Comment then takes a closer look at each requirement 
2142 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). The exact wording allows the defense if the release was 
caused solely by: 
ld. 
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, 
or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, 
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes 
by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to 
the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of 
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he 
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and 
the consequences that could foresee ably result from such acts or omissions. 
22 ld. 
2:J ld. 
24 ld. 
2Jj ld. 
261d. 
27 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897-98 (D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1983). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
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of the defense and its relation to the whole, including the influence 
of each element on the decision of the courts to treat the defense as 
if it did not exist. Finally, this Comment suggests a more lenient 
treatment of the defense that does not interfere with the congres-
sional purposes of quick response to hazardous substance releases 
and cost allocation among the responsible parties to promote greater 
care in the handling of hazardous substances. 
II. THE THIRD PARTY DEFENSE UNDER CERCLA AND SARA 
A. CERCLA and Section 9607(b)(3) 
CERCLA has relatively little legislative history. 29 Congress 
passed the Act quickly in the last days of the ninety-sixth Congress. 30 
The usual rules were suspended so that no amendments could be 
added. 31 These unusual measures were employed to assure the swift 
passage of CERCLA in the little time left in the legislative session. 32 
Both houses of Congress passed a bill along the lines of H. R. 7020 
rather than S. 1480.33 The Senate bill was, in the opinion of at least 
one observer, more stringent,34 expressly imposing strict liability. 35 
H.R. 7020 also originally included explicit language indicating strict 
liability.36 S. 1480 excluded the third party/due care defense from 
the affirmative defenses available as well. 37 Nevertheless, the bill as 
finally passed included the defense. 
The congressional record provides almost no insight into what 
Congress intended by allowing this affirmative defense while re-
stricting it with such a demanding set of criteria. 38 The House report 
gives only a general statement of the purpose behind the require-
ments for use of the third party/due care defense. 39 The House 
committee indicated that its intent was to compel defendants who 
29 See Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability ("Supeifund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982). 
30Id. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6119. 
34 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
35 S. 1480, § 4(a)(9), 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo REC. S14,940 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). 
36 H.R. 7020, § 5(a), 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo REC. H9,459 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 
1980). 
37 S. 1480, § 4(a), 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo REC. S14,940 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). 
38 See Grad, supra note 29, at 1. 
39 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 314, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6137. 
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sought to use the third party/due care defense to show that they 
had taken every precaution against a release of the hazardous waste 
that a similarly situated reasonable person would have taken under 
the circumstances. 4o This inference that a "reasonable and prudent 
person" standard is a test for liability is expressed as "due care by 
the defendant" in the statute. 41 
The Committee report also mentioned another test by which lia-
bility would be determined, the absence or presence of a causal or 
contributory nexus between the acts of the defendant and the con-
ditions that required response action. 42 This causal nexus is signifi-
cant because it indicates that Congress intended to impose liability 
only on those whose actions had some causal connection to hazardous 
waste releases. 43 This intention was, presumably, the motivating 
purpose behind inserting the third party/due care defense into CER-
CLA. Elimination of the third party/due care defense where there 
is a contractual relationship between the defendant and the third 
party, however, seems to contradict this stated purpose. 
B. SARA's Impact on the Availability of the Section 9607(b)(3) 
Defense 
In 1986, Congress revised CERCLA by passing the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act, adding several billion dollars 
to the Superfund, amending many of the existing provisions, and 
adding new provisions. 44 SARA was drafted over a period of several 
years,45 and so offers a great deal more legislative history than 
CERCLA. SARA, however, like CERCLA before it, was passed at 
the end of the congressional session.46 This relatively short time for 
floor discussion once again limited time for debate or further amend-
40 ld. 
4142 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
42 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6136--37. 
43 See Ward V. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1976). The Ward court stated 
that the purpose of strict liability in the context of FWPCA was to shift the accidental loss, 
as between non-negligent parties, to the owner or operator of the facility that caused harm. 
ld. This statement implies that there is some minimal connection to the hazardous waste 
release (in this case, water pollution), such as operation of the instrumentality that created 
the hazardous situation, which must be found for liability to attach. 
44 See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
45 Atkeson, Connors, Elrod, Goldberg, An Annotated History of the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10360, 
10366 (Dec. 1986). 
46 See id. at 10367. In this instance, the 99th Congress threatened to stay in session beyond 
its scheduled end to meet the potential challenge of a pocket veto by President Reagan. ld. 
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ment. 47 As with the passage of CERCLA, the purpose behind re-
stricting the amendment process appears to have been to allow for 
quick passage of SARA in the short time before the end of the 
legislative session. 48 Also, as with the original CERCLA legislation, 
the bill that finally passed both houses of Congress, H.R. 2005, 
contained much the same language as the bill that originated in the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 2817. 49 
There has been some discussion of the primary public policy con-
cerns which CERCLA was designed to address. The report of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee on H.R. 2817, in discuss-
ing the need for amending CERCLA, indicates that SARA was 
intended "to provide EPA with appropriate flexibility and discretion 
in order to respond appropriately to each site .... "50 The House 
Judiciary Committee also reported on H.R. 2817, and reiterated the 
CERCLA policy goals of providing for cleanup of hazardous sub-
stance releases and holding responsible parties liable for those 
costs. 51 The additional views of Representative Brown indicate that 
there was some unhappiness with the system of liability under CER-
CLA as amended by SARA. He commented that, "[n]o system of 
liability should be such that it actively discourages economic growth 
and job creation. "52 This statement suggests that there was at least 
some congressional sentiment favoring a less burdensome system of 
liability. 
Very little of SARA has any impact on the availability of the third 
party/due care defense. The one area where SARA significantly 
changes the use of the defense is in the definition of contractual 
relationship. 53 Under SARA, the definition of contractual relation-
ship no longer precludes the use of the third party/due care defense 
where the only contractual relationship was that the defendant pur-
chased property on which hazardous wastes were previously 
dumped. 54 Though this change has important ramifications for the 
47Id. at 10369-70. 
48 See id. In the case of SARA, Congress faced a possible presidential veto, and thus needed 
to allow extra time for an override vote. Id. at 10369. 
49 See 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2835. 
50 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 56, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2838. 
51 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3038. 
52 Id. at 61, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3038,3067. 
53 Pub. L. No. 99-499 § 101(f)(35)(A), codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 
1987). 
54 Id. The amendment reads as follows: 
The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of this 
title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments 
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use of the third party/due care defense, SARA did not change the 
wording of section 9607(b)(3) itself. 55 
This new allowance of the third party/due care defense despite 
the existence of certain contractual relationships demonstrates that 
the question of just who is a responsible party is far from settled. 
One of CERCLA's primary policy goals is to make responsible par-
ties pay for cleanup. 56 In the absence of a clear legislative statement 
defining "responsible party" with greater precision, the task of de-
ciding how this policy goal should be met has fallen upon the courts. 57 
III. The Role of Due Care and the Contractual Relationship 
Constraint in Courts' Analysis 
A. The Contractual Relationship Constraint 
The guidelines Congress used in determining how to structure 
liability under CERCLA are not readily apparent. Representative 
Gore, in his remarks at the end of the Committee report, stated 
that, "[i]n addition to creating the fund, the other main goal of the 
legislation originally was to clarify and codify long-standing common 
law theories as they relate to liability for damages caused by haz-
ardous waste disposal activities. "58 Representative Gore's comment 
suggests that, by looking at case law prior to the effective date of 
Id. 
transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the facility con-
cerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of 
the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances 
described in clause (i), (ii) , or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a prepon-
derance of the evidence: 
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and 
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the 
release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility. 
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, 
or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of 
eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation. 
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest. 
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he or she 
has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title. 
55 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). 
56 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3038,3038. 
57 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1983). These cases demon-
strate how the courts summarily reject assertion of the § 9607(b)(3) defense merely by finding 
a contractual relationship, without explaining how the action or omission is connected to that 
contractual relationship. 
56 H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 62 (additional views of Representative 
Gore), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6136-37. 
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CERCLA as passed in 1980, one can gain insight as to the congres-
sional intent behind the liability and affirmative defense provisions 
that were included in CERCLA.59 Relevant treatment of liability in 
the prior cases is apparently the basis for the derivation of the 
liability provisions of CERCLA.60 
There are very few cases involving something akin to the third 
party/due care defense. United States v. Price61 shows how one court 
dealt with the issues prior to the use of CERCLA.62 In Price, the 
government sued former and current owners of property upon which 
wastes were dumped between 1970 and 1972, while the landfill was 
owned by Price. 63 Both defendants claimed that they were not "per-
sons within the ambit of liability defined by the statute."64 
In considering the liability of defendant Price, the former owner 
of the site, the district court rejected Price's claim that he was not 
actively contributing to the hazardous waste leakage. 65 The court 
found that the original improper storage coupled with a failure to 
correct that condition was actively contributing to the leakage oc-
curring at the time of this action. 66 
Defendant A.G.A.'s (a real estate broker and the current owner) 
argument is closer to a true third party intervention defense, resting 
on the fact that all dumping of hazardous wastes occurred prior to 
A.G.A.'s acquisition of the property.67 The court, however, found 
that allowing a third party defense in this case was inappropriate. 68 
Despite the fact that A.G.A. neither actually placed the hazardous 
waste on the property, nor chose the original method of storage, 
A.G.A. was still liable for contributing to the release of the hazard-
ous wastes because it was currently in control of the property and 
was not taking steps to address the hazard presented by these 
released wastes. 69 The court found that demonstrable indifference 
to the condition was the equivalent of active contribution to the 
continuing release of hazardous wastes. 70 
59 See id. 
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982). This definition of liability refers to prior cases decided 
under FWPCA. 
61 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981) (action under RCRA). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1057-58. 
64 Id. at 1072. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67Id. at 1073. 
68 Id. 
69Id. 
7°Id. 
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The Price court held that, because A.G.A. knew at the time of 
purchase that the property had been a landfill, and was aware of the 
presence of toxic chemicals by the summer of 1979, "[A.G.A.] had a 
duty to investigate the actual conditions that existed on the property 
•••• "71 In other words, A.G.A. was required to exercise some de-
gree of due care. The court did not find A.G.A. liable solely on the 
basis of its contractual arrangement with the actual disposer of the 
wastes, but rather looked for and found a causal nexus in A.G.A.'s 
inaction and failure to investigate the conditions of the property 
adequately. 72 
Liability in cases based on a CERCLA action has been strict, in 
accord with the case law developed under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act and referred to in CERCLA section 9601(32).73 
Courts hearing CERCLA actions in which a party has asserted the 
third party/due care affirmative defense of section 9607(b)(3) have 
consistently rejected that defense. 74 These courts have also consis-
tently based verdicts for plaintiffs primarily on the relationship of 
the defendants to the third parties identified in assertion of the third 
party/due care defense. 75 
For example, in United States v. Argent Corp. ,76 the owner-lessor 
defendant attempted to assert the third party/due care affirmative 
defense. 77 The court denied the lessor's motion for summary judg-
ment, pointing to one of the criteria that set apart this defense as 
codified in CERCLA from the earlier approach. 78 CERCLA, at the 
time of the Argent Corp. decision, denied the defense, regardless of 
the presence or absence of due care, to any defendant who was in a 
contractual relationship with the third party whose act or omission 
solely caused the release of hazardous wastes. 79 Any contractual 
relationship between the defendant and the third party, whether 
direct or indirect, is a sufficient basis under CERCLA for denying 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
823, 843-44 (D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (D. 
Ohio 1983); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (D. Pa. 1982). 
74 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897-98 (D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1983). 
75 See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1048-49; Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 897; Argent Corp., 21 
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1356. 
76 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BN A) 1354. 
77 I d. at 1356. 
78Id. 
79 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
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the third party/due care defense to a defendant.80 In Argent Corp., 
the contractual link between the defendant lessor and the lessee was 
the lease arrangement itself.81 The court explained that the existence 
of the lease made it impossible for the lessor to show that the release 
was caused solely by a third party with whom the lessor did not 
share a contractual relationship. 82 
This explanation was not entirely accurate. What the defendant 
lessor could not show to satisfy section 9607(b)(3) was that it did not 
have a contractual relationship with the lessee, whose actions may 
have solely caused the release.83 The court's explanation gives the 
impression that the question of sole causation was reached when in 
fact the result was reached wholly on the basis of the presence of a 
contractual relationship. 84 
The House of Representatives amended the original draft of sec-
tion 9607(b)(3) to require that the third party whose actions or 
omissions form the basis of the assertion of the third party/due care 
defense not be contractually involved with the defendant.85 This 
requirement eliminates many situations in which a defendant might 
have asserted the third party defense at common law. As Argent 
Corp. demonstrates, the defense is eliminated not only where the 
third party is party to a contract with the defendant pertaining to 
the storage or disposal of the waste, but also where the parties are 
related by any contract, such as a lease agreement. 86 
The same House amendment that foreclosed the possibility of 
asserting the third party defense in contractual relationships created 
a further requirement that the third party not be an agent or an 
employee of the defendant.87 In United States v. Ward,88 the gen-
erator of PCBs was charged for response costs for the cleanup of 
PCBs dumped on the road-side by a transporter hired to remove the 
wastes from the generator's facility.89 The defendant-generator as-
80 Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1356. 
8! Id. at 1355. 
82 Id. at 1356. 
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
84 Argent Corp., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1356. 
86 126 CONGo REC. H9,461-63 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). Congressman Gore submitted this 
amendment out of concern that the due care aspect would suggest a negligence standard. It 
has been suggested that the House bill (H.R. 7020) was being toughened in order to bring it 
closer to the bill being considered in the Senate at the time (S. 1480). See supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
86 See Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1356. 
87 See 126 CONGo REC. H9,463 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). 
88 618 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985). 
89 Id. at 891-92. 
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serted the third party/due care defense, but the court rejected that 
defense. 9o The court explained that the third party/due care defense 
was not available to the defendants because the transporter was 
either an agent or employee of the generator.91 The Ward court felt 
it unnecessary to specify whether the relationship was agency or 
employment, or some other type of contractual relationship. 92 
Although not explicitly mentioned in Ward, the question of what 
precautions a generator must take against unscrupulous action by a 
transporter is important in a similar setting, where a transporter 
has dumped the wastes without the knowledge of the generator. 93 
The defendant is responsible for taking precautions against only 
foreseeable actions by the third party.94 If all indications are that an 
established transporter is responsible and reliable, and that repu-
tation is verified through some reasonable inquiry, then the roadside 
dumping by the transporter is not a foreseeable action, and thus the 
generator should be able to use the defense. 
Analysis of liability from the perspective of contractual relation-
ships, then, has evolved from the pre-CERCLA treatment, in which 
courts simply increased the level of due care required of the defen-
dant when there was a contractual relationship.95 The current stage 
of this evolution uses the language of CERCLA to make the question 
of contractual relationship dispositive. 96 The courts do not address 
question of due care. 97 
B. Due Care Analysis 
In addition to identification of a third party whose acts or omissions 
are the sole cause of the release, and who is not in a contractual 
relationship with the defendant, the defendant must also convince 
the court that the defendant exercised "due care," including reason-
able precautions, in light of the danger presented by the hazardous 
substance and the possibility of acts or omissions by a third party 
causing a hazardous waste release. 98 The courts' analyses have stated 
90 [d. at 897. 
91 [d. 
92 [d. 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(B) (1982). 
94 [d. 
95 See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1072-73 (D. N.J. 1981). 
96 See United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1355-56. 
97 See id. 
98 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
1988] CERCLA 395 
that failure to meet the due care requirement is a basis for denial of 
the third party/due care defense. 99 
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust CO.,100 Maryland 
Bank & Trust Co. (MB&T) loaned money to the purchaser of a site 
where hazardous wastes had been dumped seven years earlier (1972-
1973).101 Later, MB&T bought the property at a foreclosure sale 
after the borrower defaulted in 1981. 102 MB&T asserted the third 
party/due care affirmative defense and the government sought par-
tial summary judgment, claiming that MB&T could not meet its 
burden of proof. 103 The court denied summary judgment, placing 
importance on the issue of the defendant's notice of the presence of 
toxic wastes. 104 The court pointed out that several significant factual 
issues were in dispute, including whether MB&T knew of the pres-
ence of hazardous wastes, whether it should have been aware of the 
presence of hazardous wastes in light of the accessibility of the dump 
site, and whether hazardous wastes would be apparent from a mere 
visual inspection. 105 The opinion suggests that due care should be 
viewed in light of the particular knowledge of the defendant assert-
ing the third party/due care defense. 106 
The Maryland Bank & Trust court, however, held only that there 
was a material issue of fact, not that the defense was available to 
this defendant. 107 Thus, while there is discussion of due care in light 
of the knowledge of the defendant, the court did not go so far as to 
find that due care was exercised in light of the knowledge of the 
defendant in this particular factual setting. 
In contrast to the inconclusive discussion in Maryland Bank & 
Trust, the due care issue was at the center of the Second Circuit's 
consideration of the affirmative defense in New York v. Shore Realty 
Corp. lOB In Shore Realty, the defendant had purchased a tract of 
land on which leaking hazardous waste containers were present. 109 
The defendant knew that the containers were on the site, and an 
99 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 581-82 (D. Md. 1986). 
100 632 F. Supp. 573 (D, Md. 1986). 
101 ld. at 575. 
l02ld. 
103 ld. at 576. 
104 I d. at 581. 
lO5ld. 
106 See id. 
107 ld. 
lOB 759 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1985). 
109 ld. at 1038-39. 
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environmental consultant had apprised the defendant of the danger 
posed to the environment by their state of disrepair. 110 The court 
rejected the defendant's claim that it was not liable by virtue of the 
third party/due care defense. l11 In this case, the court seemed to 
place a greater emphasis on the need for the defendant to take 
positive precautionary steps to mitigate the harm caused by third 
party actions.112 Despite the presence of a contractual relationship 
between the defendant and the third party whose actions were being 
regarded as the sole cause of the release, the court provided a full 
explanation of the basis of liability.113 The court did not simply rely 
on the presence of a contract, but carefully pointed out how the 
defendant had failed in its duty to take precautions. 114 
By providing this explanation, the Shore Realty court did more 
than compel the liable party in this case to pay. The court also gave 
the impression that it considered all pertinent information and that 
the result was a comprehensive analysis of all elements of the third 
party/due care defense. 115 Another indirect benefit of this holding is 
that it specifically warned purchasers of real estate. that t~y must 
take active steps to remedy any potential hazardous waste release 
on their property. 
Given that SARA is a set of amendments that was absorbed into 
the body of CERCLA, and because it was so recently passed, rela-
tively little case law has developed that treats the third party/due 
care defense "under SARA," as opposed to "under CERCLA." Re-
cently decided cases nonetheless reflect some of the concerns ex-
pressed in SARA that the third party/due care defense was narrower 
than it should be. 116 
In one of the most recent cases to consider the issue, Jersey City 
Redevelopment Authority v. PPG Industries,117 the court denied a 
current landowner's motion for summary judgment based on the 
third party/due care affirmative defense. 118 The court, for purposes 
110 [d. 
111 [d. at 1048. 
112 [d. at 1048-49. Just what steps Shore Realty could have taken to satisfy the due care 
requirement is not stated. At least after Shore Realty took title and evicted the tenants who 
dumped the waste, the court felt some steps should have been taken to prevent further 
dumping by the tenant, which dumping apparently occurred. [d. at 1049. 
113 [d. at 1048-49. 
114 [d. 
115 See id. 
116 See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987). 
117 [d. 
118 [d. at 1262. 
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of summary judgment, applied the SARA definition of contractual 
relationship, though it did not reach the question of whether the 
date of the amendments made them applicable to the case. 119 Using 
the CERCLA guidelines as amended by SARA, the court found the 
determinative issue to be whether the present owner knew or had 
reason to know that the property held hazardous contaminants. 120 
The courts' "had-reason-to-know" language indicates a case by case 
consideration of what is required of the defendant, rather than a 
rigid requirement that the defendant take specific steps in every 
case. 121 This approach adds more flexibility to the due care test that 
courts may apply to assertions of the third party/due care defense. 122 
This flexibility is significant in that it indicates that the courts would 
be willing to apply a flexible test to elements of a CERCLA action, 
such as distinguishing between third party actions that are directly 
connected to the contractual relationship and those that are not. 123 
In the cases where the standard of care has been determinative 
in the section 9607(b)(3) defense, the courts have approached the 
issue as a two-tiered test. 124 First, the court looks to the circum-
stances of the partiCUlar case to see what facts were known, or 
should reasonably have been known by the defendant. 125 Second, the 
court examines whether, in light of what a reasonably prudent de-
fendant would know under the circumstances, the defendant in fact 
exercised the requisite due care. 126 
In cases where the defendant is the owner of a site on which the 
wastes in controversy are released, the courts have focused their 
analysis on whether the defendant knows, or should know, of the 
presence of hazardous substances. 127 In cases such as United States 
v. Ward involving generators, the court often decides the validity of 
the third party defense against the defendant because of the pres-
ence of a contractual relationship, and never reaches the first step 
of this two-tiered test. 128 Such a decision leaves potential defendants 
119 I d. at 1261-62. 
120 I d. at 1262. 
121 See id. 
122 Compare PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. at 1262 with 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (1983 & 
Supp. 1987). 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 151-53 for a further discussion. 
124 See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 581 (D. Md. 1986). 
1251d. 
126 See id.; see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985). 
127 C[ United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897 (D. N.C. 1985) (the court decided this 
case on presence of contractual relationship only, and did not reach this analysis). 
128 Id. at 897. 
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to speculate about what the court would look at in determining due 
care on the part of a generator. In many, if not most cases, the 
presence of a contract is not the only reason for the imposition of 
liability, yet is the only reason discussed. 129 Verdicts for plaintiffs 
would have a sounder basis if all reasons for a verdict were discussed 
in full. This discussion would include factors that a defendant must 
consider before entering into any contract relating to the storage or 
disposal of hazardous wastes in order to meet the burden of due 
care. In addition to the presence of a contract, the defendant may 
have unreasonably ignored the potential threat of a hazardous waste 
release. 130 The court would render a more acceptable and complete 
decision by explaining this additional reason for denying the defense. 
The factors determining whether the defendant exercised due care 
must depend on the particular facts of the case. If the release was 
the result of improper storage at the disposal facility, then the issue 
could well be whether the generator knew or should have known 
that the owner or operator of the facility was incompetent or oth-
erwise likely to allow a release of the hazardous waste. If the release 
was the result of a transporter illegally dumping the hazardous waste 
while in transit, as in Ward, the question would be whether the 
generator had reason to know that the transporter might act in such 
a manner. 131 
Regarding the second tier of this test, the court in the Maryland 
Bank & Trust case pointed out that analysis of this aspect of the 
test is dependent on a finding of what the defendant should reason-
ably have known. 132 After noting that the record was incomplete as 
to what the defendant should reasonably have known, the court 
stated that, without detailed information, it could not decide whether 
MB&T exercised due care. 133 In contrast, the court in New York v. 
Shore Realty Corp. decided that the defendant site owner had failed 
to meet the standard of proper precaution, but gave no guidelines 
on what precautions should have been taken. 134 SARA's addition to 
the definition section of CERCLA provides some guidance as to what 
129 See Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 887; United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1983). 
130 See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1049. 
131 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6137. 
132 See United States V. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 581-82 (D. Md. 
1986). 
133 ld. 
134 New York V. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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sort of care a subsequent owner of a disposal site must exercise. 135 
Section 9601(35)(B), however, deals only with a very narrow area 
and leaves potential defendants in circumstances other than that of 
subsequent owner without much guidance in this area. Thus, the 
problem is that the contractual relationship restriction eclipses due 
care analysis in the courts' analysis. 
IV. Suggested Changes in Treatment of the Third Party Defense 
Under CERCLA 
The lack of a basis for determining what actions could be taken to 
ensure the exercise of due care is partly attributable to the manner 
in which the contractual relationship restriction is drafted and ap-
plied to the third party/due care defense. 136 CERCLA does not 
explain what constitutes due care. 137 That Congress in SARA chose 
to lift the contractual relationship restriction in the area of land 
purchases shows some congressional awareness that such a blanket 
constraint on the third party/due care defense was not a fair method 
for ensuring that response costs are recovered. The most glaring 
example of the inequitable outcomes that may result from an abso-
lute denial of the third party/due care defense would be a generator-
transporter relationship, as in Ward, but where the generator had 
no knowledge or reason to know that the transporter would illegally 
dump the hazardous wastes. 138 Holding the generator liable might 
be proper if the transporter hired had relatively little experience 
handling hazardous wastes, or had a past record of irresponsible 
behavior. Under such circumstances, a generator could foresee the 
possibility of mishandling the toxic waste. The contractual relation-
ship restriction, however, prevents the court from considering the 
due care element. 139 
The courts' predeliction for addressing only half of the reason for 
denying use of the third party/due care defense is not necessarily 
135 See 42 U.S.C.A. §. 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1987). The requirements include reasonable 
inquiry consistent with good commercial or customary practice, any special knowledge of the 
defendant, and the obviousness of the presence of hazardous wastes. 
136 See United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354,1356 (D.N.M. 1983). 
The statute makes lack of a contractual relationship a prerequisite for assertion of the third 
party/due care defense, but courts ignore language that the defense is precluded only if action 
is connected to the contract. See id. In Argent Corp., the contractual relationship is a lease, 
and the connection to hazardous waste release is tenuous at best. [d. 
137 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended 1986). 
138 United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985). 
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982) (amended 1986). 
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the sole fault of Congress in placing such a broad limit on the use of 
the third party/due care defense. The wording of the defense allows 
a defendant to assert that the release is solely caused by a third 
party other than "one whose act or omission occurs in connection 
with a contractual relationship . . . . "140 As construed by the courts, 
this provision covers any action by a party involved in a contractual 
relationship, except as allowed under the new section 9601(35)(A).141 
This construction of section 9607(b)(3) is not the only one possible. 
Construed more narrowly, this provision could be read to rule out 
assertion of the defense when the transporter, in removing the haz-
ardous substance, accidentally causes a release. 142 The defense could 
be asserted, however, when the transporter acted in direct violation 
of the contract and simply dumped hazardous substances in a vacant 
lot. 143 
In the former situation, where the transporter is trying to trans-
port hazardous wastes in compliance with the contract, the release 
occurred in carrying out terms of the contract. This sort of release 
is an act or omission "in connection with [the] contractual relation-
ship. "144 In the latter situation, the action was completely outside of 
the contemplation of the parties in their contractual relationship. 
This construction, differentiating actions that are contemplated by 
the contracting parties from those that constitute intentional behav-
ior by one party totally outside of the intent of the contractual 
arrangement, would simply allow the defense to pass a summary 
judgment motion in certain situations where the third party action 
would not reasonably be contemplated by a defendant entering into 
a contract. Application of this construction does not mean, however, 
that the defense would succeed if asserted. The due care, two-tier 
test must still be met. 145 
Another difficulty with the contractual relationship provision is its 
overlap with the exclusion of the defense for third parties who are 
either "an employee or agent of the defendant . . . . "146 The treat-
ment of such parties in the courts' consideration of the third party/ 
due care defense shows that this overlap is something of a redun-
140 [d. 
141 See Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 897; United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1983). 
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982) (amended 1986). 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 12W5. 
146 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
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dancy.147 The Ward court, for instance, stated that the third party/ 
due care defense was not available to the defendants because the 
transporter was either an agent or employee of the defendants, or 
was in a contractual relationship with the defendants. 148 If an agency 
or employment relationship exists between the defendant and the 
third party whose actions are to be used as a defense, an underlying 
contractual relationship that bestowed the status of agent or em-
ployee on the third party must also be present.149 Congress must 
therefore have had some other reason for including the employee or 
agent restriction in the language of section 9607(b)(3). 
Unfortunately, nothing in the Committee reports comments on 
this particular clause. One possible explanation for the agent/em-
ployee rule is that Congress wanted to be especially sure that the 
third party/due care defense was not asserted when the release or 
threatened release was the result of action or omission by a party 
tied to the defendant by either an employment or agency relation-
ship. 
This explanation for the existence of a prohibition on the third 
party/due care defense when there are either employment/agency 
contracts or contracts generally would lead one to speculate that the 
general "contractual relationship" constraint is a "safety net." The 
"safety net" would prevent a defendant from arguing that the third 
party whose actions or omissions are to be interposed as a defense 
is not really an agent or employee, but rather is in some other 
contractual relationship with the defendant not covered by the sta-
tutory exclusion. Congress, for the first time, tacitly acknowledged 
that it cast the net too widely when it restricted the scope of the 
contractual relationship constraint in SARA.150 
Allowing the defense in this singular contractual situation-the 
land sale contract-is significant, but it does not comprehensively 
address the problem of over-inclusiveness. This partial retraction of 
the "safety net" leaves a roadblock in the use of the defense in 
situations that are similar to land use contracts. One such similar 
situation is where courts hold owner-lessors liable when they are 
unaware of the lessees' illegal dumping of hazardous wastes on the 
site. 151 
147 See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897 (D.N.C. 1985). 
148 [d. 
149 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58,471 (5th ed. 1979) (definitions of agency and employ). 
160 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A) (West Supp. 1987). 
151 See United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1984) 
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Some change in the restriction of the third party/due care defense 
is thus in order. The process of amending the categories of persons 
liable begun by SARA should be carried further. Dropping the con-
tractual relationship restriction would be extreme, because there are 
times when a party to a contract should be liable for all actions or 
omissions of the other party to the contract, such as respondeat 
superior in an employment arrangement. 152 Congress could take less 
extreme action by adopting language that distinguishes between 
actions that arise directly from the contractual relationship and ac-
tions that occur outside of the authority of the parties under the 
contract. 
Adoption of such language would lead to a greater number of cases 
in which the parties litigated the issue of due care. l53 Adoption of 
such language might also lead the courts to state the requirements 
of due care in particular fact situations. Such a full examination of 
all the issues pertinent to the availability of the third party/due care 
defense would help avoid the triumph of form over substance in 
which a defendant is held liable without all the facts surrounding the 
question of causation being considered. 154 
This sort of complete analysis would have two immediate beneficial 
effects. One effect would be that such an analysis would put future 
defendants on notice as to the exact burden they must meet in terms 
of due care. Precise requirements may encourage voluntary compli-
ance with the standard established, because the waste disposal in-
dustry would have a clearly understood standard with little ambi-
guity. The other effect would be that such an analysis would further 
the stated congressional purpose behind CERCLA of allocating the 
cost of hazardous waste cleanup to the responsible parties155 by 
allowing innocent defendants to prove their innocence and forcing 
the government or private plaintiff to find the truly responsible 
parties. 
Another purpose also deserves consideration, that of providing for 
prompt and effective cleanup of hazardous waste releases. l56 Certain 
152 See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897 (D.N.C. 1985). 
153 See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (D. N.J. 
1987). 
154 See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); 
Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354. In both of these cases there was no discussion 
of whether the release of the hazardous wastes was "in connection" with the contractual 
relationship. See supra note 42. 
155 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. 
156 [d. 
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cases will arise where the only party capable of paying a judgment 
for the cost of cleanup is the defendant seeking to assert the third 
party/due care defense. It is unthinkable that, in its zeal to make 
the Superfund self-supporting, Congress valued an easy recovery of 
expenditures above a desire to hold liable only those parties whose 
acts or omissions had some causal nexus to the release of hazardous 
wastes. 157 Accordingly, the proper allocation of liability should have 
priority over the desire to make the Superfund a self-sufficient re-
sponse enterprise. 
To take a contrary view goes against all principles of justice in 
both statutory and common law. l58 To say that any party going into 
an enterprise that puts that party in risk of violating CERCLA must 
take its chances that it may be held liable ignores the fact that such 
parties already pay for cleanups in paying the tax dollars that create 
the Superfund. 159 Structuring CERCLA so that only truly respon-
sible parties must pay response costs in a civil action does not let all 
other parties off the hook. 160 Rather, such structuring means that, 
in those cases where the clean-up costs cannot be recovered through 
civil action, the entire industry must bear the cost through increased 
taxes to support the Superfund. 
V. Conclusion 
The steps Congress has taken to address the problem of hazardous 
waste releases in enacting CERCLA and SARA represent a sub-
stantial effort to remedy one of the most dangerous threats of our 
time to human health and the environment. The use of the Superfund 
ensures that resources are available for responding to hazardous 
waste releases. The system by which response costs are recovered 
through civil action provides the double benefit of replenishing the 
Superfund and allocating the burden to responsible parties in the 
hazardous waste related industries. 
157 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6136-37. 
158 See Ward V. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1976). The purpose of strict 
liability under FWPCA, and thus under CERCLA, is not to recover costs in the easiest 
manner possible, but rather to allocate the burden as between non-negligent parties, to the 
party who has chosen to be at risk. Id. This purpose has been changed under CERCLA so 
that, when several parties have put themselves at risk by working with hazardous wastes, 
the courts no longer worry about the proper allocation of the burden. They hold liable any 
party who can be held liable under a technical reading of the liability provisions. 
159 See Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 511-517, 100 Stat. 1760-74 (1986). 
160 See id. 
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CERCLA does allow a very limited set of affirmative defenses for 
situations where certain actions are completely beyond the control 
of the defendant. Of the three allowable affirmative defenses, only 
the third party/due care defense has restrictions placed upon it. 
While some form of restriction is necessary to prevent overuse of 
the third party/due care defense, courts, after the passage of CER-
CLA, went too far in use of the contractual relationship restriction. 
This use of form over substance led to a dearth of cases considering 
the due care element of the defense because the defense was essen-
tially rejected before being considered. As a result, very little case 
law exists to guide parties involved with hazardous substances in 
exercising due care. 
With the passage of SARA, Congress rolled back one corner of 
the blanket contractual relationship restriction in the area of real 
estate purchase agreements where all dumping of wastes occurred 
prior to the sale of the property. There was also some language in 
section 9601(35)(A) discussing due care in the area of real estate 
transactions. This change in the law should encourage more courts 
to reach the question of due care. 
More change, however, is needed. Congress needs to further refine 
the scope of the contractual relationship restriction. Actions taken 
by the parties in a contractual relationship that do not foreseeably 
arise from that contract should still be a basis for asserting the third 
party/due care defense. To deny the defense when based on such an 
act or omission is to create a causation fiction on the basis of any 
agreement between the parties, regardless of its content. 
Absent a legislative redrafting, the courts need to take a closer 
look at the language of section 9607(b)(3) to see that not all actions 
or omissions by a third party in a contractual relationship with a 
defendant are actions or omissions connected to the contract. A 
looser reading of section 9607(b)(3) would allow courts to reach the 
question of due care and to determine which defendants are actually 
in the causal chain of a hazardous waste release, and which defen-
dants should not be held liable for response costs. 
